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Public-Sector Employment Under Siege 
STEPHEN F. BEFORT* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Joseph Slater’s presentation adopted a “best of times, worst of times” 
theme.1 But while he accurately notes the high union density rates in the public 
sector,2 it is clear that the bad news concerning public employment currently 
predominates over the good news. Whatever high hopes there may have been for 
progressive advances when President Obama first took office, current public-sector 
employment can aptly be described as being under siege. 
As Professor Slater vividly describes in his article, the principal culprits at work 
are the continuing economic recession and the resulting widespread governmental 
budgetary woes.3 The economic downturn has imposed a double whammy on 
public employers in the form of reduced tax revenues and lower stock values in 
pension fund holdings.4 State governments in 2010 are in the worst fiscal shape 
since the Depression.5 Economic conditions deteriorated dramatically for state and 
local governments during 2009,6 continued in 2010,7 and are expected to worsen in 
2011.8 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s “Great California Garage Sale”9 
symbolizes the desperate economic conditions faced by the forty-eight states that 
experienced a deficit in 2009.10 During its two-day sale, California sold nearly six 
hundred state-owned vehicles, office furniture, computers, electronics, jewelry, 
pianos, a surfboard, a food saver, and an Xbox 360 gaming system.11 Despite these 
efforts, the state was forced to issue IOUs worth $1.95 billion.12  
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With nearly every state required to maintain a balanced budget,13 state and local 
governments have scrambled for ways to reduce costs. Not surprisingly, public 
employers frequently took aim at their workforce costs, one of their most 
significant discretionary expenses.14 Governmental employers have resorted to 
layoffs, hiring freezes, wage freezes, and employee furloughs, among other options, 
in order to reduce personnel expenditures.15 
Political fallout has accompanied the economic fallout. The Wall Street Journal, 
for example, has stated, “America’s most privileged class are public union 
workers.”16 Former Minnesota Governor and presidential candidate Tim Pawlenty, 
in an op-ed piece, argued that the moral case for unions does not apply to public 
employment and that “public-sector unions have become the exploiters.”17 The 
same view is expressed in a New York Times article that describes a nationwide 
“rising irritation with public employee unions.”18 As Professor Slater chronicles in 
his article, this “irritation” has intensified since our November 2010 symposium, 
culminating in several well-publicized state legislative rollbacks in public-sector 
collective bargaining rights.19 
This Article explores three particular aspects of the current public-sector crisis. 
Part I examines the plight of public school teachers and their unions. Part II 
discusses the recurring nature of public-sector budgetary shortfalls. Finally, Part III 
looks at attempts by government employers to alter the terms of collective 
bargaining agreements on a unilateral basis. 
I. TEACHERS 
While budget and image problems have affected public employees generally, 
one group not discussed in depth by Professor Slater—public school teachers—has 
become a particular target of vitriolic attack. Here, the economic problems have 
been compounded by widespread concerns about the subpar performance of our 
public education system. 
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The popular movie Waiting for “Superman,” based on a book of the same name, 
illustrates the growing perception that teachers and their unions stand in the way of 
meaningful education reform.20 Teacher unions are widely seen as protecting 
poorly performing teachers by clinging to the privileges of tenure and by opposing 
performance-based pay innovations.21  
Legislative bodies throughout the country are debating reform measures. As of 
May 2011, seven states had enacted legislation restricting tenure rights or collective 
bargaining rights for teachers or both, and many others states were considering 
similar measures.22 A Florida statute, for example, abolishes tenure for newly hired 
teachers and mandates that schools implement performance-based evaluation 
measures.23 Tennessee took a different tack and replaced its collective bargaining 
law for teachers with a new statute that provides for “collaborative conferencing.”24 
The push for pay-for-performance reform has not been limited to conservative 
proponents. The Obama administration itself has joined the effort through its Race 
to the Top program.25 In 2010, the Department of Education awarded twelve grants 
to assist states that propose creative pay-for-performance programs.26 While some 
of the most successful programs featured collaboration with teacher unions, the 
most well-known program was a divisive, top-down redesign engineered by 
Michelle Rhee, the chancellor of the District of Columbia school system, that left a 
bad taste in the mouths of many.27  
The point is not that educational reform is unnecessary or that performance-
based teacher evaluation systems are a bad idea. However, our schools suffer from 
many other problems, including poor funding and the socio-economic obstacles 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. WAITING FOR “SUPERMAN” (Paramount Vantage 2010); KARL WEBER, WAITING FOR 
“SUPERMAN”: HOW WE CAN SAVE AMERICA’S FAILING PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Karl Weber ed., 
2010). 
 21. See, e.g., Andrew J. Coulson, The Effects of Teachers Unions on American 
Education, 30 CATO J., Winter 2010, at 155 (2010); Evan Thomas & Pat Wingert, F: Why 
We Can’t Get Rid of Failing Teachers, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 2010, at 24. 
 22. See Joy Resmovits, Teacher Tenure Under Fire from Statehouses, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 12, 2011, 5:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/12/teacher-tenure-
under-fire-from-state-legislatiures_n_861279.html.  
 23. See Ron Matus & Jeffrey S. Solochek, Scott’s Signature Changes Teaching, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Mar. 25, 2011, at 1A. 
 24. Andrew M. Ballard, Collective Bargaining: Tennessee Governor Signs Legislation 
Nixing Collective Bargaining for Teachers, 49 Gov’t Emps. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 724 (June 7, 
2011). 
 25. See U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(2009), available at www.ed.gov/programs/race to the top/index.html.  
 26. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nine States and the District of Columbia Win Second Round 
Race to the Top Grants, ED.GOV (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/nine-states-and-district-columbia-win-second-round-race-top-grants. 
 27. See generally Bill Turque, District Teachers Approve Contract; Agreement Expands 
Rhee’s Power to Fire and Bases Pay on Results, Not Seniority, WASH. POST., June 3, 2010, 
at A1; Michelle Rhee, What I’ve Learned; We Can’t Keep Politics Out of School Reform. 
Why I’m Launching a National Movement to Transform Education., NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 
2010, at 36. 
234 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:231 
 
 
faced by students from low-income or immigrant communities.28 Meaningful 
educational reform will take place only if teachers and their unions are enlisted as 
allies rather than demonized as a stand-alone problem.29 
II. CYCLES OF FISCAL CRISIS  
While the severity of the 2010 budget crisis is relatively unique, the existence of 
public-sector budget crises is not. The most recent crisis constitutes the fourth such 
period in the last thirty years. In 1982, 1991, 2003–2004, and now in 2009–2011, 
states and local government units faced similar budget problems.30 During the first 
era, in the early 1980s, more than half of the country’s 275 biggest cities 
experienced budget shortfalls.31 During the second era, in the early 1990s, a 
majority of the states faced severe fiscal problems.32 Likewise, in fiscal year 2002, 
during the third era, thirty-eight states cut budgets by a record $13.7 billion,33 and 
the number of budget-cutting states increased to forty in the following year.34  
The four periods of state budget problems arose from similar causes. Each 
followed close behind an economic downturn resulting in decreased tax revenues.35 
There is evidence that the states are largely unable to prevent budget shortfalls 
during cyclical recessions,36 which is a problem that states are likely to continue to 
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face in the future.37 Moreover, political pressures work against responsible 
planning, such as setting aside “rainy-day” funds, as tax cuts are politically popular 
when governments run surpluses.38  
The cyclical nature of these budgetary shortfalls provides both good news and 
bad news. On the positive side, this means that public-sector budgets eventually 
will improve as the economy recovers.39 But it also means that public employment 
likely will experience recurring bouts of crisis for the foreseeable future. What 
remains to be seen is whether the current political antipathy focused on public 
employees also will shift with the economic cycle or whether the Tea Party 
movement and related phenomena signal a more permanent change in public 
opinion.  
III. UNILATERAL CHANGE AND THE CONTRACT CLAUSE  
In the highly unionized public sector, managerial attempts to rein in personnel 
costs have put stress on the collective bargaining process. Not surprisingly, many 
public employers have adopted aggressive positions at the bargaining table as a 
means of coping with fiscal strains.40 Sometimes, however, governmental entities 
have taken more drastic measures such as attempting to modify existing contractual 
agreements on a unilateral basis. In the private sector, such unilateral action would 
be deemed both a breach of contract remediable in arbitration and an unfair labor 
practice subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Although 
similar unilateral change rules also exist in most public-sector jurisdictions, such 
limitations may not apply when a governmental entity with law-making authority, 
such as a state legislature, enacts a statute or ordinance that trumps the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement. If that entity is not a statutory “employer” under 
the pertinent state statute,41 the only limitation on the entity’s lawmaking authority 
is the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.42 Although the Contract Clause 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Id.; Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, The Relative Variability of State 
Income and Sales Taxes over the Revenue Cycle, 23 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 97, 111 (1995). 
 38. James A. Papke, The Response of State-Local Government Taxation to Fiscal Crisis, 
36 NAT’L TAX J. 401, 404 (1983). 
 39. But see Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Mounting Debts by States Stoke 
Fears of Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1 (stating that some financial analysts are 
concerned “that even when the economy recovers, the shortfalls will not disappear, because 
many state and local governments have so much debt . . . that it could overwhelm them in 
the next few years”).  
 40. See Ronald Kramer, High “C’s” Ahead: Public Employer Collective Bargaining, 
Contractual and Constitutional Hurdles in Concessionary Bargaining, 42 URB. LAW. 739, 
739 (2010); Donald D. Slesnick II & Jennifer K. Poltrock, Public Sector Bargaining in the 
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J.L. & EDUC. 661, 662–64 (1996). 
 41. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral 
Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1245–46 (1985) (indicating that most public-sector labor 
relations statutes do not include the state legislature within the definition of a covered public 
employer).  
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Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
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literally proscribes any impairment of contract, the U.S. Supreme Court has long 
recognized that a state may modify a contract by legislation that is reasonable and 
necessary to serve an important public purpose.43 This justification becomes more 
problematic, however, when a legislative body impairs one of its own contracts for 
the purpose of reducing its own financial obligations. 
In United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a New Jersey statute that retroactively repealed a covenant between the 
state and certain bondholders that limited the use of revenues pledged as security 
for rail passenger transportation purposes.44 In striking down the New Jersey 
statute, the Court adopted a heightened standard for scrutinizing laws that impair 
public contracts, stating that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of 
reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at 
stake,”45 and that “a State is not completely free to consider impairing the 
obligations of its own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives.”46 The 
impairment of public contracts is constitutional, the United States Trust Co. Court 
stated, only if “reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”47 
The Court noted that an impairment is “reasonable” only if the parties did not 
foresee at the time of contracting the possibility of changed circumstances48 and is 
“necessary” only if there are no less drastic alternatives available for safeguarding 
the public interest.49  
The courts have struggled to apply the United States Trust Co. standard in cases 
challenging unilateral alterations of collective bargaining agreements. Three recent 
decisions illustrate the diversity of viewpoint.  
In Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled that unilateral action imposed by a legislatively created fiscal authority passed 
the “reasonable and necessary” test.50 The court gave substantial deference to the 
governmental action, stating that “we find no need to second-guess the wisdom of 
picking the wage freeze over other policy alternatives.”51  
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 2008 that the City of 
Benton, Arkansas violated the Contract Clause when it unilaterally reduced health 
care premiums for retired city employees.52 The court in that case examined the 
city’s plea of financial exigency on a de novo basis and concluded that the city’s 
evidence fell short of establishing the existence of an “unprecedented emergency” 
or a “broad economic problem” sufficient to warrant the city’s unilateral action.53  
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434, 438 (1934). 
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 45. Id. at 26. 
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2010 decision, upheld a 
county’s furlough plan that unilaterally reduced work schedules by eighty hours.54 
The Fourth Circuit construed the collective bargaining agreements at issue as 
incorporating the county’s personnel law, which expressly authorizes the adoption 
of a furlough plan upon the county executive’s determination that such a plan is 
required in order to respond to a shortfall in revenue.55 The court concluded that 
since the furlough plan was authorized by the collective agreements, no impairment 
resulted and an analysis of the reasonable and necessary factors was not required.56   
Over the past thirty years, more than twenty published decisions have applied 
Contract Clause analysis to unilateral government actions.57 Most of these courts 
have properly applied the principles established by the Supreme Court in the 
United States Trust Co. decision so as to restrict the permissible scope of self-
serving legislative modifications. “A significant minority of decisions, however, 
have afforded substantial deference to such modifications even though they 
occur[ed] in a context in which the legislative body [was] hardly a disinterested 
observer.”58 While the legislative impairment of governmental contract rights is a 
necessary safety valve in some circumstances, an underlying theme of many of the 
minority decisions is that public-sector collective bargaining agreements are not as 
worthy of protection as other types of governmental contracts.59 This view is an 
undesirable vestige of the discredited notion that public employees owe a duty of 
“extra loyalty” to the state.60 In the end, a governmental body should be sustained 
in impairing its contract obligations to its employees on the same basis as other 
self-serving impairments; that is, only when such impairment is reasonable and 
necessary to serve an important governmental purpose.61 
CONCLUSION 
Public employment is currently under siege. The problem is a familiar one. An 
economic recession depletes anticipated tax revenues resulting in significant 
budgetary shortfalls. The budgetary woes, in turn, give rise to economic efforts to 
curtail personnel costs and to political efforts to curtail the rights of public 
employees and their unions. The political fallout, not atypically, leads to calls for 
public employees to bear a disproportionate share of the budgetary burden. A 
common thread in these recurring periods of fiscal crisis is the fact that many still 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty., 608 F.3d 183 (4th 
Cir. 2010).  
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think of public employees as having first class obligations, but only second class 
rights. Ideally, a public-sector budgetary rebound will help to debunk this view. 
